

CIVIL SOCIETY OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE BETWEEN TRANSFORMATION AND GLOBALIZATION

Thematic unit coordinator: Karol Haratyk,
Jagiellonian University,
karolharatyk@gmail.com

**4TH MARCH
PART I AND II**

PECULIARITIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE

ANTONIE DOLEŽALOVÁ

CIVIL SOCIETY'S LIMITATIONS

Every one of us has an idea of what the term civil society encompasses. The paper does not aim to present a new definition of the term. Instead it poses some pressing questions which arise within the context of the renewal of civil society in post-communist countries:

1. what is civil society and what characterises it
2. what paths has the process of renewal of civil society in post-communist countries followed
3. where in the spectrum between state and private institutions is civil society placed
4. what degree of confidence does civil society enjoy among citizens themselves?

This question will be answered in stages as we:

1. explain the institutional framework which determined the initial circumstances for the renewal of civil society,
2. clarify the historical evolution of civil society in Czechoslovakia after 1989 (in the Czech Republic since 1993),
3. present the concept of not-for-profit organisations as part of civil society,
4. examine the hypothesis that the Communist past is merely a stereotypical, always readily available, interpretation when we try to rationalise the limited extent of the development of civil society.

The examination of the hypothesis will not question what institutions are included in the not-for-profit sector but it will question whether this sector can actually be a means of building civil society in post-Communist countries. There are a number of significant limitations here that have to be taken into account, two of which are noteworthy: the way not-for-profit organisations are financed and their public usefulness.

DANIEL PLATEK

**CIVIL SOCIETY OR CIVILIAN SOCIETY? POST-WAR
POLAND IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORICAL
SOCIOLOGY.**

In my presentation, I will try to indicate the need for a more capacious and historical category of analysis for the historical phenomenon of the relationship between state and society in Poland. In reply to critics of the very well known sociological concept of civil society founded by Jeffrey Alexander, which concerns the space of civil society as a "neutral view" of the world, free from religious, political, or indigenous networks of trust, I propose the category of "civilian society" (J. Keane, S. Eisenstadt, A. Gramsci) as a more appropriate tool for analysis of the processes of social mobilization in Poland. I will focus on the historical processes of mobilization based on the 'horizontal' networks of trust (family ties, self-help social networks, formal/informal political organizations and the institution of Church). The phenomenon of the emergence of informal networks of social dissent represents "civilian society" in itself, but it does not lead to the exclusion of religious meanings from the public domain. Such an approach involves the replacement of the classical categories of civil society by the term "civilian society" (C. Calhoun), which is determined by reference to such phenomena as networks of trust and trajectories of social mobilization (Ch. Tilly, D. McAdam, M. Osa). Taking into consideration social protests in the post-war Poland, I will try to justify the use of term "civilian society" in place of Enlightenment term civil society, which seems to be losing its legitimacy in the context of the specific changes in the relationships between state and society (Ekiert, Kubik). In my speech I will emphasize theoretical and methodological issues related to operationalization of terms such as networks of trust and dynamics of protest mobilization as an indicator of public sphere development in Poland which is an inalienable component of fully-fledged democratic regimes.

VICTOR KHROUL

**CIVIL SOCIETY AND MASS MEDIA TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA:
CHALLENGES AND HOPES FOR VALUES DIALOGUE**

The transformation in Russia changed the entire society, caused many significant consequences for the mass media landscape and raised hopes for the civil society development. But last two decades were mostly the time of political and financial problems domination, social problems and the necessity for values dialogue in the society have been systematically ignored by mainstream media with their focus on "*infotainment*".

The economic recession of last two years awoke the discussion on values, that seemed to be swept out from the public sphere. Money, prosperity, self-sufficiency as values and goals to achieve are becoming radically questioned and more and more doubtful. Fundamental, spiritual values are becoming more and more visible in terms of their lack or even absence in the public sphere.

In this context the initiative of some civil society institutions and religious organizations on setting up a co-regulatory body for the most influential media - the Public Council for Morality on TV - seems to be an indicator of recent situation with the dialogue of values in the country.

But there are some obstacles, that make its implementation very problematic.

1. *The absence of value consensus in Russian society.* In a multi-normative society with coexisting different values and normative models caused by poly-confessional and poly-ethnic social structure, and with other factors of diversity, the activity of any council for morality would be successful only if there would be a critical level of agreement about what is "good" and what is "bad".

2. *The absence of a system for moral monitoring in mass media and public sphere from value defined, axiological, homogeneous social institutions and groups.* The highest level for aggregate judgments in the moral sphere will not be the societal level (the whole country), but a morally united, monolithically homogeneous community in which members are in consensus about *good* and *bad*. That is why they could be named "crystallization centers" or "leading lights".

3. *The absence of a well-articulated dialogue of value systems.* If the moral monitoring of current events and facts has a place, if the "leading light" works in a proper way, it would be possible to speak about the articulated dialogue of value systems within the frames of constructing a normative model. It is a fundamental and necessary condition for the formation of a balanced broadcasting policy.

Moral dialogue in society is seen more naturally as a polyphony of voices mutually respecting axiological homogeneous social institutions than as a dissonant choir of the Public Council members voices composed of the leaders of society, all singing in different keys.

This normative model presumes the "shift" for mass media from their agenda setting "dictatorship" to the mediatization of the dialogue of values. They are expected to become the developer, the promoter, the "catalyst" of the dialogue of values in the public sphere.

ALEKSANDRA M. DUDA

SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM AS A CONTEXT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY MOBILIZATION

The phenomenon of growing political activism before and during the “coloured revolutions” gave new impetus to academic discourse on civil society and political systems in the former Soviet republics. However, what existing explanations of this phenomena usually omit is situating the protesting public in a broader political and historical contexts of political opportunities and obstacles for political mobilization in illiberal regimes. Such an approach has an evident shortcoming - it neglects the ambiguity of the concept of civil society in post-communist regimes, a problem that has attracted limited attention from contemporary social scientists.

By engaging in the current debate on the dynamics of social movements in hybrid regimes, this paper sheds new light on the role of the mass mobilisation during the Rose and Orange Revolutions. It shows that neither the “the civil society argument”, which placed considerable emphasis on the role of NGOs during the “coloured revolutions”, nor the “personal charisma” argument, which linked the personality of opposition leaders to the waves of protest, offer satisfactory explanations for the mass mobilization in Georgia and Ukraine, particularly when discussed separately. Instead, it is proposed in this paper to examine the major stages of the civil society’s activity in communist and post-communist Georgia and Ukraine by linking them to the peculiarities of the post-1991 political system that developed in these two countries.

The focus on semi-authoritarianism as characteristic of Shevardnadze’s and Kuchma’s periods in power contributes greatly to this discussion on political opportunities and obstacles for political mobilization in illiberal contexts. Hence, the fixed and more volatile aspects that defined the nature of the Shevardnadze and Kuchma regimes serve as the main pillars of contextual setting for asking the following questions in order to find out: 1) What were the political factors that contributed to the outbreak of youth collective action at that particular moment? 2) Who was more likely to rebel and why? 3) What key political developments

facilitated/impeded the success of Rose and Orange Revolutions? What was the impact of the external environment?

It is argued in this paper that traditional political opportunities played a significant role in shaping mass protest development, thus highlighting the enduring significance of some social-movement theorists' work (e.g. Tarrow 1994, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Meyer 2004). Although in countries with hybrid political systems the phenomenon of any movement's emergence still poses some questions for social-movement researchers, the concept of "semi-authoritarianism" exposed the existence of similar factors characteristic of this regime type which affected the movements' activities in a specific way. In Georgia and Ukraine, the features that decided on the nature of Shevardnadze and Kuchma's regime provided a main tool for understanding the outburst of political protest in a hybrid form of a political system. To put it differently, the knowledge of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of these two systems allows key insights into how political pre-conditions in post-communist contexts have inspired and shaped the origins and dynamics of mass mobilization.

LELA REKHVIASHVILI

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN NEOLIBERAL STATE (ABOUT GEORGIA)

After the war in 2008 between Russia and Georgia it was acknowledged that up to forty thousand ethnically Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs) didn't have opportunity of return in the foreseeable future. In contrast with the post conflict situation in early 1990's, this time international society as well as national civil society organizations that had by the time acquired experience of handling with IDP issues were quickly mobilized for humanitarian response. The donors pledged 4.55 billion dollars for Georgia's post war recovery one fourth of which was meant to be spent on IDP issues that would be spend by the government; besides, wide variety of projects were funded and implemented through international and national civil society organizations. The broad aim of the efforts formulized by major actors was to respond to the long term needs of IDPs which meant most importantly the provision of housing and opportunities for social and economic integration. Despite impressive financial input, numbers of projects, important coordination mechanisms devised by numerous actors it remains questionable if the aim of providing long term solutions has been achieved.

The question of the paper is what is the explanation of the shortcomings of the long term problem solutions to the needs of Internally Displaced People aftermath the 2008 Georgia-Russia's war? Through discussing this question I want to address broader question concerning the role of civil society in resolving specific social problems.

The paper will be based on the numerous reports provided by organizations involved in problem resolution or monitoring the process and up to 25 in depth semi- structured interviews with beneficiaries of humanitarian response projects, representatives of

international and national NGOs and representative of Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation of Georgia.

The question will be discussed in the framework of theoretical debates around neoliberal understanding of the role of civil society and on the other hand the role of the state in resolution of social problems. The case is interesting as it is the example of very organized and well coordinated cooperation between international and national civil society organizations and government. Despite the efforts the results were disappointing for IDPs as well as involved NGOs as they faced limitations of the implications of their projects in bringing about credible long term solutions. Problem identified is the understanding of role of civil society as complementary to the role of the state. While global and national civil society attempts can be very helpful they often appear to be not sufficient, generating unequal coverage, and being disposed to severe constraints in achieving long term and sustainable resolution of social problems. This is not because of the shortcomings in their efforts but because of the limitations to tackle larger structural issues in the situation when government retreats from resolving social issues and building social security nets. Therefore conceptualizing the role of the civil society goes hand in hand with conceptualizing role of the state, and in this paper I will argue that civil society (national and international) should be perceived not as complementary but as supplementary to the state actions and neoliberal understanding of the state should be revised in the first turn.

MARKO KOVACIC

THE IMPACT OF CIVIL SOCIETY ON DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CROATIA AND SERBIA

Civil society in the area of former Yugoslavia played an important role in transformation from communism to democracy. By contrasting the two countries that had the most influence on the overall political dynamic of the Western Balkans, the cases of Croatia (where CSOs were the crucial actors) and Serbia (with its less institutionalized civil society contention; riots, protests etc.) I will show the difference between the beginnings of consolidation processes.

Civil society is considered to be a sphere in which there are active citizens with the basic principle of freedom of association and solidarity. Fundamental units of civil society are civil society organizations and the main roles of civil society are introducing citizens to the concept and practical use of democratic political culture, building social capital and watchdog function. In this paper I will present what the tasks of civil society in Croatia and Serbia were and evaluate their success. –analyzing the difference in organization and magnitude that influenced democratic consolidation. Discourse and thematic analysis will be the key methods in studying the topic.

Croatia is often used as an example of a country with no contentious tradition¹ but it would be incorrect to claim that civil society did not play a profound role in some aspects of the state building process. One of the most important moments happened in 1999 when the coalition of 149 CSOs formed a coalition named “Glas 99”² that indirectly helped the opposition in winning the election. Considering it that was the first time that the Croatian Democratic Union lost their elections in independent Croatia, that moment is considered to be the beginning of the consolidation process. This paper examines the political opportunities and the structure of civil society at that time and correlates it with the change of government in 2003 (from right center to left center).

Serbia, on the other hand, is often referred to as the case in which civil society started a revolution against president Slobodan Milosevic and his regime. Slobodan Milosevic and his Socialistic Party of Serbia were ruling the country (and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) in an autocratic way where civil liberties were ignored. How did the student social movement “Otpor”³, formed in 1998 and growing into a revolution bring down Milosevic and how could we call Serbia a democracy under the rule of such an authoritarian president? Those questions will be answered in the paper.

I will argue that civil society played a crucial role in the beginning of the consolidation process in Serbia and Croatia. Even though in both countries the change occurred with the huge impact of civil society, there is a difference. In Croatia, civil society was more institutionalized and implicit, while in Serbian civil society had a role of contentious action and the magnitude of the action was bigger. The paper will show that Croatia was more democratic than Serbia in the 90s so which was the reason for the different approaches and methods.

¹ Since the independence in 1991 there were only two big protests organized by civil society (even though the trend has been changing in the last two years)

² Voice 99

³ The Resistance

CIVIL SOCIETY FROM LOCAL PERSPECTIVE

KATARZYNA ZAJDA

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AS PART OF RURAL CIVIL SOCIETY. THE SPECIFICITY AND SIGNIFICANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLISH COUNTRYSIDE.

The NGO sector is very important for the rural areas transformation. It is called "other NGO sector". It is significantly different from that which is typical for urban communities. The differences relate to (in example) objectives of the activity, methods of raising funds for activities or the meaning for the local communities.

This article aims to: a) analysis of the specificity of rural NGOs as a component of rural civil society, b) illustrate the differences between urban and rural NGOs sector, c) indication of the different aspects of so called "old" and "new" rural non-governmental organizations, d) identification of the importance of these organizations in the context of the challenges facing rural areas after 1989.

KAROLINA KOZIURA

SYMBOLIC POWER AND DEPENDENCE. LOCAL COMMUNITY TOWARDS THE NGOs PROJECT. THE CASE OF TOWN OF CHERNIVTZI IN WESTERN UKRAINE.

At the present, establishing non-governmental organizations in Central and Eastern Europe is becoming the key factor with which to measure the condition of the civil society and democratization processes (Hardy 2010). Nevertheless, in the opinion of Vira Nanivska, Director of the International Centre For Policy Studies in Kiev, the main problem of NGOs working in Ukraine is that they have never been a part of local communities to whom their activities are addressed. Consequently the involvement of local communities in particular projects is marginal. The point of view of Nanivska showed me that to understand the meaning and influence of NGOs in building civil society, first we need to get the knowledge of the context of their work.

After 1989 a number of scholars of anthropology of post-socialism dealt with the cultural crash of operational standards of western organizations in the East (Wedel 2001, Hann 1996, Verdery 1996). In the opinion of Steven Sampson (1996) the best description of the phenomenon of establishing NGOs in the Balkans is the category of 'benevolent colonialism'. Based on the methodology employed by this scholar I would like to interpret the context of the project, which is realized by one of Ukrainian NGO. This organization and its activity in the town of Chernivtzi (Western Ukraine) has been the subject of my anthropological investigation for more than one year.

In my speech I would like to present the way, how this organization has been seen in the perspective of local community. By describing the details of the project and NGO activity I would like to show four points: how the organization is setting up its project in the town, who is the leader and how he or she is creating the picture of organization, what kind of symbols are created by the NGO and last but not least what kind of ideology does it produce among locals? I believe that, answers to this questions show the context of NGOs activity, which in my case is the best described by the terms of symbolic power and dependence so those who raised Steven Sampson by thinking of 'benevolent colonialism'.

In my opinion, the 'thick description' of local community and their perception of NGOs project will raise significant points to consider about what is civil society on Eastern Europe ground and how should be define?

EWA POLAK

**LOCAL CONCEPTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY –
CASE OF EKATERINBURG (RUSSIAN FEDERATION)**



In most cases, when scholars talk about a civil society, given social reality is being compared to the certain idea which has its roots first of all in West-European conceptions and Enlightenment ideals. This matter appears particularly interesting, as to countries of the former Eastern bloc, where with the fall of the Iron Curtain we dealt with the transfer of certain ideas – of democracy, free market economy, political pluralism, civil society ect. To what extent the civil society in postsocialist countries has a chance to be a local creature, and to what extent it is adaptation of the Western models?

During several months of my anthropological field research lasting in Ekaterinburg (Russian Federation) I dealt with the issue of local interpretations of the civil society – both of it's discursive conceptualisation and of manifestation in the form of practices – of public protests, „the immediate action”, interventions at deputies, activity of numerous non-governmental organizations or writing letters of complaint to the prosecutor's office. It could seems that term 'civil society' will be used mainly by liberal-democratic circles, however in Ekaterinburg also other groups (communists, national-bolsheviks, local authorities or consulting

companies) are familiar with this idea – using it and giving completely different essence to the notion and understanding it differently. What is the civil society according to these groups? What is exploiting by them this idea supposed to serve?

And to what extent dealing with practices of the civil society of postsocialist countries should we refer to the West-European tradition of this idea? Paying attention to the fact, in what ways ideas are creatively adapted to the local context and how they are growing out of local reality, not being only an imported product, it is worthwhile to give some thought to our categories of the description. Perhaps and so it is worthwhile examining the civil society and its manifestations on two levels – both in West-European as well as local understanding this notion. Perhaps only such a new quality will let us answer a question for the condition of the civil society in Russia and other states of the former Eastern bloc...

In my presentation I would like to present both local interpretations of what the civil society is and how it manifests itself in Ekaterinburg, and to suggest broader reflection over this notion.

**5TH MARCH
PART I**

CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE YOUTH

TETYANA VASILYEVA

PECULIARITIES OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF UKRAINIAN AND POLISH YOUTH IN TRANSFORMATION WORLD

Transformation - the process of internal changes of society through which it can overcome the loss of balance. This is the limit of absolute social tension, which is achieved by new, more differentiated, higher level of orderliness and organization in all spheres of life.

Internal changes in every modern independent society are under the influence of globalization - the process of global economic, political and cultural integration and unification. As a result of globalization the world becomes more connected and more dependent on all its subjects.

Globalization has consequence and negative phenomena, such as opening borders for international crime, the spread patterns of deviant, illegal behavior, capitalism, including its negative manifestations and values such as rapid enrichment and pragmatism. Therefore, the important problem of today is building of civil society in each of state and create a single space with the moral, cultural, legal values, which would be aimed for strengthening peace, priority of human rights and freedoms, justice and legality.

The subject of our research is the consciousness of young people of Ukraine and Poland, the bright representative and creator of changes in today's global world. Our countries have many similarities in cultural and historical development, but differ with modern economic and political processes, national character. We will study if the level of legal awareness of young generation is different in these countries.

The youth because of the age, physiological and psychological characteristics is a specific social group with its motives, interests, values and life position. Now, the evidence of this is involving of youth in subcultural formations, revolutionary movements, protests and events, which attract public attention, active reaction to social change and transformation, rising crime level among young people.


The urgency of this research is obvious, as the way to assert principles of legal country in Ukraine and Poland, civil society and integration into European and global world community requires a high level of standards and the integrity of society, a unified system of moral and legal norms. The effectiveness of such system is possible under the circumstances of internal recognition of such order by individuals. The way for this, is legal consciousness with a clear understanding of permissibility and inadmissibility for ourselves and others.

The legal consciousness is the special form of reflection and assessment of the legal reality which is characterized by knowledge, beliefs, predispositions to certain behavior in the realization of individuals and is a motive force in the legal field.

The high level of legal consciousness depends on regulatory legal act declared by state authorities, corresponds to moral norms of society and internal commitment of a person. Such acts often cause mixed feelings and indignation of the population in Ukraine.

We analyze the World Values Survey, which covers several waves since 1981, and compare the level of legal culture of Ukrainian and Polish Youth (wave 2005-2008).

	UKRAINE					POLAND				
	Mean	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	15-29 years	30-49 years	50 and more	Mean	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	15-29 years	30-49 years	50 and more
1. Justifiable: claiming government benefits	3,4	2,69	4,0	3,4	3,0	2,3	1,88	2,9	2,2	2,0
2. Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport;	3,8	2,78	4,2	3,7	3,8	2,5	2,12	3,4	2,4	2,0
3. Justifiable: cheating on taxes;	3,1	2,38	3,9	3,4	2,5	2,4	2,15	3,2	2,4	2,0
4. Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	2,5	2,1	2,9	2,7	2,1	1,4	1,16	1,6	1,3	1,2



As we can see, the level of legal consciousness of Ukrainian youth is lower than Polish, in general, the same trends are traced to the population of these countries too. In the European context, Ukraine and Poland take close positions, but the excuse level for accepting a bribe and tax evasion is lower by Polish respondents than the average European. The aim of our study is to examine the causes of legal consciousness deformation of youth and ways of legal culture improving in general.

ERIN SALTMAN

CIVIL SOCIETY: RADICAL RIGHT CULTURE AND THE YOUTH IN HUNGARY

I would like to address the rise in youth support for right-wing and radical-right parties and organizations in Hungary, relating to the post-Communist development of civil society. After large decentralization efforts post-1989 few civic institutions or organizations existed while Hungary was trying to reform parts of its identity and culture. Where liberal and left-wing political groups and non-governmental organizations have failed to cultivate a vibrant civil society, right-wing and radical-right political parties and paramilitary organizations are developing a new sense of political culture and a community environment on local and national levels. This paper will focus primarily on the radical-right political party Movement

for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) and on its paramilitary counterpart organization, the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda). In my opinion, these two groups are one of the largest influences on developing political culture and civil society among the youth population in Hungary.

Jobbik was founded in 2002 as the Right-Wing Youth Association. Created by a group of Catholic and Protestant university students, Jobbik became an official political party in October 2003. Appealing mainly to young and educated 20 to 35 year olds, Jobbik worked to create a sense of belonging and a space for the youth within politics that had been lacking in Hungary. By using openly anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric and keying on old traditional symbols, such as the pre-Trianon Treaty, large map of Hungary and the Árpád flag, Jobbik was able to procure 16.57% in the last elections, making it the third largest political party in Hungary. Jobbik's ability to use facebook, youtube and other youth-based information outlets have also been a large draw for young people developing their political and cultural outlooks. Jobbik's paramilitary counterpart, the Magyar Gárda, was created in 2007 as a well-organized volunteer based militia created for the 'Hungarian cause'. This group helped give Jobbik a grassroots feel that was particularly appealing to the youth. As the largest and most well-known paramilitary organization in Hungary, Magyar Gárda has controversially marched through cities and villages against 'Gypsy Crime', but has also acted as an active community organization helping houses during the recent floods and toxic waste spill.

The main purpose of this paper will be to analyze the relationship between the development of civil and political culture in Hungary and the influence of the radical-right on the youth. I will touch upon policies, political support, and various developments from 1989 till present.

OLEKSANDR SVYETLOV

UKRAINIAN STATE POLICIES TOWARDS CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

My research will be based on the assumption that the level of young Ukrainians' engagement in sociopolitical structures, exemplified by CSOs, is directly dependent upon, and positively correlated with the scope and degree of state responsiveness towards young people's efforts, channeled through CSOs. By improving the effectiveness of CSOs through responsiveness of the state institutions and policies we can raise the quantity and quality of young people's socio-political participation.

A key dimension of political activity of young people is their commitment to ongoing participation in civil society organizations - CSOs, which themselves are seen as conduits between the governed and the governors. In this context the state's attitude and policy towards civil society organizations are as important as the CSOs' opportunity structure and their impact on the formulation and implementation of state policies. Youth volunteer organizations in this respect should receive special attention and preferential conditions from

the state due to their fragility and societal importance in educating and promoting politically and socially active youth and future citizens.

The analysis of the past and current state policies towards them will necessitate provision of policy recommendations concerning the framework of legal and practical interaction in the triangle “the state – CSOs – young population”.

The rationale behind this work lies in the desire to find out what motivates young people’s civic and political participation, and what preconditions are necessary for undertaking collective action. By addressing such concepts as external/internal political efficacy, political opportunities, mobilising structures, organizational capacities and state policies I would like to analyse how they account for the emergence and development of youth action in Ukraine.

Civil society organizations, especially those consisting of young people are important channels of political participation in terms of “giving voice”, in providing a link between authorities and young population – future and current electorate. Government legitimacy, accountability, transparency as well as civic education promotion for the new generation are constitutive aspects of this relationship. Engagement with public socio-political sphere from young peoples’ perspective appears to be most successful if it is reciprocal with those in power. The state policies towards CSOs are traditionally deficient, and civil society’s relations with state authorities and politicians are not satisfactory. This is seen as a disincentive for young people to engage in formal and informal political / civic activities.

The Conception for Civil Society Development, which was introduced by the government as a policy paper in 2007 but not fully implemented till now will also be analysed in detail in terms of provisions and implementation. Further legal acts which regulate the operation of CSOs will be assessed in order to detect main problems of national legislation and their realisation.

ROLE OF INTELLECTUALS IN CIVIL SOCIETY

ANELE VOSYLIUTE

LITHUANIAN SOCIOLOGY: TOWARDS DIVERSITY

Post-socialist Lithuania is connected with the process of democratization, national freedom, economic, social and cultural reforms and new reality. The system of public opinion is characterized by pluralism of political views, difference in attitudes to state and private property (emerged new institutions of the market economy), new concepts of everyday life styles. New social movements give a potential for new needs and interests. Social scientists became like “keepers” of those categories which reflected new people’s activity practices, the importance of theoretical discussions on citizenship and democracy, new social mobilization in country. Such concepts as ‘change’, ‘modernization’, ‘pluralism’, ‘democracy’, ‘national state’, ‘civil society’, ‘new identity’, ‘social change’ were used frequently in common usage and in analyses of sociologists. The importance of a market system with dominating private ownership and civil society (which is impossible in totalitarian political system) is emphasizing in public discourse as the social ideal of society; the interests of state and civil society coincide in the definition of welfare state.

In the paper the author stresses how the power of contradicting theoretical positions or different methods construct in sociology a permanent intellectual discourse. Social and human disciplines are important actors which keep under control some groups of society. New paradigms of science and the revealing of new social phenomena enrich the sociological knowledge. The approaches of sociology reveal different relations between knowledge and domination; the dominator acquires knowledge about the dominated, which reinforces its/his power (M. Foucault theory).

SORIN BORZA
IOANA ALBU

**ON THE INTELLECTUALS IN THE EAST
AND THE NEW CONSENSUS CULTURE**

The present paper is a reflection upon the current state of intellectuals in Eastern Europe and their relation to the European values, as well as on the direction of the Romanian academic environment, challenged by the „giving up to the European spirit” in the social relationships.

The tentative of triggering a debate referring to the Intellectual „temptation” of consensus in eastern Europe lies, right from the start, under the double menace of the interlocutors’ indifference: on the one hand because one might reject the discussion out of reasons such as the *lack of public interest*, and others under the argumentation that *this is not a good time for challenges*. A critical view on the social and political effects of the intellectual consensus would not be taken over consensually.

We believe that it is high time we concentrated upon matters the understanding of which would bring about an immediate gain in the field of the social and diplomatic relationships with the European partners. We do not have in mind here the logical relocation of some European themes, but also the dismissal of the populist discourse.

What do the intellectuals in the East have to say in a European world? Who and how long can be left aside to indifference the derailing of a sort of neo-anarchism and the giving up of the „European spirit” that has tried, for some time, the Romanian academic milieu – these are but a few of the main subjects the present paper tries to address and open to debate.

GABRIEL C. GHERASIM
RALUCA MOLDOVAN

**THE BETRAYAL OF THE INTELLECTUALS?
THE FAILURE OF THE CIVIC ALLIANCE PROJECT
IN ROMANIA AFTER DECEMBER 1989**

The domestic and international public opinion has often drawn attention to the fact the Romanian realities in the aftermath of December 1989 did not undergo the expected radical transformation. The new political structures, both at the top level and at the local administration level, were made up of members who had belonged to the former communist political structures. In response, a part of the Romanian society showed the need for a civic organization model which would represent a genuine opposition to post-communist regime

led by Ion Iliescu and his collaborators. The project of the Civic Alliance, drawn up at the end of 1990, was a bold one: denouncing the political police and the former totalitarian structures was part and parcel of a positive project aimed at establishing a genuine civil society in Romania. Referring to the dissidence of the Czech, Polish and Hungarian intellectuals during the communist regime, one of the Civic Alliance most prominent members, the poetess Ana Blandiana, spoke about this new project in terms of an organization comprising the entire Romanian society, even though this project was belated in Romania. The hopes of all those who supported this project were that a series of prominent members of the Romanian culture and intelligentsia would succeed in laying the foundation of a “civil society” and “public opinion” in the traditional sense that these terms had in the Western democracies. The present paper aims at tracing the definitive moments that marked the changes occurring in this democratic project and at arguing that – to a significant extent – its failure can be regarded, in a certain sense, as a “betrayal of the intellectuals”. In all likelihood, two decades after the events of December 1989, the main flaw of the Romanian society might be the absence of a public opinion playing the same role that it does in traditional democracies. We will try to show how and why the absence of public opinion in the contemporary Romanian society may be considered the main failure of the Civic Alliance movement.